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RECENT CASES

requisitioned property. 5 Conversely, market value may be just as inadequate where it fails to include all relevant considerations of value.
That there was no adequate market available in the instant case
seems a proper finding in light of these past cases, and in such a situation the court must then look to other measures of valuation. One of
these measures, that of retention value, concerns the value which may
be realized by retaining property for future disposal. This measure
was advanced where an owner of requisitioned property sought an
award in excess of existing OPA price regulations. But retention value
was expressly rejected by the United States Supreme Court as an improper measure of value in that case.6
The primary reason for rejection of retention value has been that
it is highly speculative.7 Recognizing this objection, the court in the
instant case expressly rejected it as an element in computing the final
allowance. But notwithstanding this declaration, the court went on
to award $4,000 for the tires-an amount which would seem to be based
necessarily on retention value, since the only value of the tires for other
than scrap iron must have rested on their retention for possible future
use or sale, there being no present market for the tires.8
This indirect recognition of retention value by the court, labeling
it actual value, may have stemmed largely from the fact that the main
objection to retention value, its speculative quality, was not particularly applicable in the instant case. That is, although retention value may
usually be a highly speculative measure of value in contrast to market
value, and hence objectionable, once market value has been discarded
as being inadequate, the objection immediately becomes less forceful.
For it then appears that an acceptable measure of value which is not
subject to a high element of speculation is practically unobtainable.
This being true, the objection to retention value is substantially mitigated and its consideration as an elment of recovery may seem completely proper.
It is submitted, therefore, that although retention value has been
held as not properly an element of valuation, evidence of it may have
some effect on the decision o f a court. For if the facts indicate that
the usual objection of speculativeness does not exist, the court may
indirectly include such value in arriving at its award, even though
seemingly bound to formally reject it.
CHARLEs J. BuRMIsTER, '55

6

United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943).

United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121 (1950).

7 The

other objection-that retention designed to await lifting of government price restrictions should not be encouraged-is not pertinent to this
analysis of the instant case.
8 See Swiss Federal Rys. v. United States, 112 F. Supp. 357 (Ct. Cl. 1953)
(dissenting opinion).

